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ABSTRACT
Property is rare in most nonhuman primates, most likely because their lifestyles
are not conducive to it. Nonetheless, just because these species do not frequently
maintain property does not mean that they lack the propensity to do so. Primates show
respect for possession, as well as behaviors related to property, such as irrational decision
making regarding property (e.g. the endowment effect) and barter. The limiting factor in
species other than humans is likely the lack of social and institutional controls for
maintaining property. By comparing primates and humans, we gain a better
understanding of how human property concepts have evolved.

Property is a concept taken almost for granted among modern Western peoples (at
least, until there is a dispute over it). We not only have an intuitive understanding of
mine and yours, but also a series of social norms, rules, and governance structures set up
to manage the relationships dictated by the presence of property. Yet for all of our focus
on property, little is known about how this concept evolved. How did we become the
only species on earth to have these complex rules of ownership and succession? It is
possible that our sense of property is emergent in humans, a result of our cognitive
complexity or advanced culture (e.g. Noles & Keil, this volume; Kalish and Anderson,
this volume). On the other hand, it is also possible that these complexities are
continuations of the basic property or possession behaviors seen in some other species.
In fact, there are other species which seem to have at least elements of a sense of
property (Stake, 2004). Among primates, there is evidence for a sense of property both
from observations and from experimental situations. Notably, several primate species
behave as though objects in the possession of others belong to that individual (Kummer
& Cords, 1990; Sigg & Falett, 1985). Moreover caching species, such as jays and
kangaroo rats, hide food items for later retrieval, and may even move them around to
avoid snooping competitors (Dally, Emery, & Clayton, 2006; Emery & Clayton, 2001;
Preston & Jacobs, 2005). Many of these caching species are phylogenetically quite
distantly related to humans, indicating that this behavior emerged in several species based

on similar ecological constraints, known in evolutionary terms as convergence1, and may
be widespread through the animal kingdom.
To understand the emergence of our sense of property, it is useful to explore the
behavior both broadly within the animal kingdom and more specifically among other
primate species, particularly the apes, as they are our closest phylogenetic kin. Studying
how property in these species is different from (or similar to) that of other species,
especially in concert with an understanding of the environmental characteristics which
may have led to convergences, can help clarify how the human property concept evolved.
1. Defining property
Among humans, the law is the institution perhaps most interested in property, and
so a good starting point. The law defines property with respect to the relationship
between people that gives rise to the agreement that one object is mine and another is
yours (Bentham, 1914). Bentham went so far as to assert that property did not exist
before the laws regulating it. However, this definition conflicts with the folk notion of
property as a relationship between an object and a person, and denies out of hand the
possibility that property could be based on behaviors or concepts present in other species
(Stake, 2004).
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Convergence is an evolutionary mechanism in which different species evolve similar characteristics (here,
property-related behaviors) because of similar environmental constraints. The other mechanism I discuss is
homology, in which different species share similar characteristics because both are descended from a
common ancestor who displayed the behavior. As a simple example, both blue jays and eagles share wings
through homology, because their mutual common ancestor to both species also had wings. On the other
hand, blue jays, bats, and butterflies all have wings through convergence; their mutual common ancestor
did not have wings. Instead the benefits of taking advantage of an open ecological niche, the air, provided
pressure which increased the likelihood of wings developing as the appropriate mutations arose. Note that a
close phylogenetic relationship may imply a homologous relationship, but does not guarantee it; the traits
could also have arisen independently through convergent processes. While the distinction is critical and
often overlooked, for the purposes of this paper it is largely irrelevant whether a particular shared trait
evolved through homologous or convergent processes, because we are interested in the presence or absence
of property-related behaviors in other species and are not developing a phylogenetic tree based on this data
to trace the evolution of these behaviors

There is evidence in favor of this latter position. Children as young as eighteen to
twenty-four months of age show inferences about the ownership of property (Fasig,
2000). Such inferences may be due to mechanisms such as following the heuristic that
the first possessor of an object is the owner (Friedman & Neary, 2007; Friedman et al,
this volume). While even at this early age ideas about ownership could be learned
through interactions with adults of the species, this early start indicates the possibility of
a predisposition towards property. Moreover, other species seem to have some basic
behaviors which are consistent with the idea that a thing can belong to a specific
individual. For instance, some species show begging and sharing behavior in relation to
food, instead of simply taking by force the food that is desired (e.g. chimpanzees;
Goodall, 1986), which indicates that food is seen as having an owner. Several species of
nonhuman primates behave as if possession is a special state. In these primates,
individuals do not attempt to take objects which are in another’s possession, even if the
possessor is the subordinate individual (Kummer, 1991; Kummer & Cords, 1990).
Interestingly, the United States legal system also prioritizes possession when dealing with
property disputes (Stake, 2004). This phenomenon, termed respect for possession, will be
discussed in more detail later, but provides strong evidence for a basic sense of property
shared between humans and other species.
Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that possession of property is not an
emergent property of human institutions, in particular the legal system, and that some
precursors to the behaviors and attitudes which led to property as seen in the human sense
can be seen in other species. Looking for these precursor behaviors in other species can
help to identify the ways in which property evolved and pin down criteria which may be

important for the development of the concept of property. To begin, we first need an
operational definition of what is meant by property and which specific behaviors would
be evidence for its presence.
In order to maintain property, an individual needs to maintain control over an
object which is not a part of its body. Of course, property can be lost, stolen or
transferred, so permanent maintenance of access is not a necessary requirement for
property. From a biological perspective, there are two different forms of property, that
which is physically in one’s possession, and that which is maintained despite being
outside of one’s physical control. For the sake of simplicity, I refer to these, respectively,
as possession and ownership.
Maintaining possession is likely the simplest form of property. In this case, an
individual maintains an item by keeping that item under its physical control at all times.
Functionally, this is defined as the individual touching the item in some way (in an
appendage, mouth, beak, etc). Although in the most trivial sense, this form of property is
essentially ubiquitous, as any time an individual picks up a piece of food to consume, it is
in its possession, possession also extends beyond this. Individuals may maintain
possession for more extended periods of time, in which case norms or standards of
conduct, for how items in another’s possession should be treated may be formed. For
instance, among ravens, individuals who possess an item can expect to maintain it, even
if a larger or otherwise more dominant individual approaches. These norms are upheld
through third-party interactions in which uninvolved third parties will attack those who
steal from another raven (Heinrich, 1999). Such norms indicate that possession has a
special status in these species.

The second form of property, ownership, is that over which one maintains control
even when the item is not in one’s possession. This may include such resources as dens,
nests, or home ranges, although these are typically group resources which are defended
by and shared by all the members of the social group. In a few species, ownership
includes another critical resource, food. In species which cache food items, such as
squirrels, individuals maintain property without possession, and reclaim those objects
when they need them for survival, such as in the scrub jays discussed above. Note that
such property need not be due to respect for ownership; in many cases property may
remain under the individual’s control either because it is hidden from others, or because
the individual who has ownership or possession is dominant, so others cannot easily take
the items.
What seems to set human property apart from that of other species is the extensive
reliance on the goodwill of others to assist in the maintenance of ownership (e.g. property
outside of one’s possession) through third-party reinforcement. In humans, this takes the
form of both institutional structures to maintain ownership rights (police forces, legal
systems) and the tendency of humans to respect each other’s property ownership. As
mentioned above with respect to the ravens, third party norms do exist in other species,
but typically only for current possessions, and not with respect to ownership. This may be
due to the inability of other species to convey information beyond the immediate, as can
be done with language. This means that third-party interventions can only occur in
situations in which the transgression was witnessed by a potential supporter (Brosnan,
Grady, Lambeth, Schapiro, & Beran, 2008). Moreover, while many of us may resort to
the legal system to reclaim property which has been taken from us, the truth is that in a

well-functioning society, this recourse is required surprisingly rarely, particularly with
respect to how often property we own is left outside of our immediate possession. People
routinely leave their jackets on a seat during the intermission at a play or their grill on the
deck of their house or apartment and seem to expect that these items will still be there
upon their return. And in fact, they usually are. The question, then, is what is it that
makes human property so different?
2. Property in primates
Property in primates is rare, and exists almost exclusively in the form of
possession, not ownership. Primates do maintain territories, or home ranges, sometimes
individually and sometimes in groups. These can be considered a form of property,
although given the frequency of territorial behavior across the animal kingdom, this tells
us little specific about the evolution of property. Unlike some other animals, no primate
(outside of some humans) relies on caching as a major food source. This is most likely
an ecological constraint. Food is the most obvious object for animals to store as property,
as it is essential for survival. However, primates typically live in areas where at least
some food source is available year-round, allowing them to forage for food as they need
it. Moreover, caching is impractical for most primates; they typically eat foods which do
not store well, such as fruit, negating the utility of maintaining food for any extended
period before consuming it. Thus, the opportunities for food as property, particularly in
the form of ownership, are limited.
Primates behave in other ways which are indicative of some concept of possession.
One primary manifestation is the remarkable respect for the rights of the possessor of an
object shown by some species (Kummer, 1991; Kummer & Cords, 1990). Chimpanzees

show a ‘respect for possession’ which allows individuals to maintain possession of an
item, even in the presence of the alpha male (Goodall, 1972). This ability is not limited
to the apes, either. Several monkey species show evidence of respect of food possession
(Perry, 1997; Sigg & Falett, 1985). Outside of the realm of food, hamadryas baboon
males show respect for the females in each other’s harems (Kummer, Götz, & Angst,
1974), not attempting to mate with them or claim them even though these harem units
interact with each other on a daily basis.
What qualifies as ‘possession’ varies between species. In some species, even
holding an object is not sufficient; individuals must be able to transport the object in
order for others to respect possession. In an experimental study, long-tailed macaques
respected ownership when the owner had possession and was able to carry the object.
Respect for possession broke down, though, even when the owner had possession of the
object, in two cases. First was if the possessor could not carry it with them because it
was tethered to the floor. Second was if the object had a trailing string (similar to a kite
tail) which extended beyond the possessor’s immediate vicinity. In either case, the more
dominant individual typically took control of the object. In these macaques, proximity
was also not sufficient to maintain possession (Kummer & Cords, 1990).
Not all species have such stringent requirements for possession. Among
hamadryas baboons, proximity is sufficient to trigger respect for possession, and in some
cases even the memory of a previous possession may be sufficient to trigger this response
(Sigg & Falett, 1985; see also Friedman et al, this volume). This variation in
experimental outcomes is most likely due to differences in the socio-ecology of the
different species. Hamadryas baboons evolved in a situation in which a valuable

possession (e.g. harem females) was in proximity, but not under physical control,
widening the concept of possession in this species.
One of the challenges in assessing possession is that it is difficult to determine
whether possession is respected as a norm versus for more prosaic self-serving reasons.
In many cases, it appears that non-norm based accounts exist to explain animals’
interactions over possessions. For instance, food calls may serve to identify possession,
which could indicate a norm. On the other hand, the food call may also indicate how
likely a challenge is from the possessor. Thus, failure to obtain the food after hearing a
food call may be due to non-possessors avoiding a potential fight rather than respect for
possession (Gros-Luis, 2004; Krebs, 1982). Similarly, among chimpanzees it has been
hypothesized that the intense motivation to keep a food reward is what allows lowerranking individuals to sometimes maintain possession of a carcass following a monkey
hunt, rather than a social norm respecting possession (Goodall, 1986). Finally, it is also
likely that ‘possession norms’ are due at least in part to reciprocity. High ranking
individuals may refrain from taking the property of those who rank below them in order
to keep those lower-ranking individuals as grooming or mating partners (de Waal, 2005).
These different mechanisms make assessing ‘pure’ respect for possession difficult.
Humans, too, may fail to take resources for many of these same reasons. However, there
are some situations in which the evidence does indicate the presence of social norms
related to possession. In some species, third party interventions may reduce the
frequency with which owners are challenged for their possessions. Although in these
cases the non-possessor may not attack for self-serving reasons, the fact that a third party
intervenes indicates the presence of possession-related norms. Among long-tailed

macaques, possession was more likely to be challenged for older possessors, who are less
likely to scream and, hence, attract support, which the authors propose as evidence of
third-party norms supporting possession rights (Kummer & Cords, 1990).
However, none of these studies gets at ownership, or possessions outside of one’s
immediate control. This is partly due to the lack of situations in which ownership
appears in the wild. Thus an alternative approach, which allows for more explicit control,
is to investigate these phenomena in the laboratory. In fact, chimpanzees do seem to
recognize that they ‘own’ something beyond their immediate possession in the laboratory.
Although in laboratory studies subjects are typically given a food reward for each desired
response, chimpanzees are willing to work for rewards (food items or tokens) which
collect in a specified location and then are given to the subjects en masse (Wolfe, 1937;
Cowles, 1937; Sousa & Matsuzawa, 2001). This indicates that, at least on some level, the
chimpanzees understand that the rewards are ‘theirs,’ even though they are not in their
possession. Chimpanzees understand this even if there are several collections of tokens
or food, only one of which contains items which are ‘theirs.’
As part of another study, chimpanzees were tested in pairs in which each
individual could trade tokens for food rewards. These tokens consisted of symbols which
represented various foods which were made available in the study; these symbols had
been used by each of the chimpanzees since infancy and so had strong associations. The
chimpanzees each had a separate food bin, with different food items available to them
than were available to their partners. Each could obtain only the foods that were present
in their bin by trading the appropriate token for it, despite being able to see their partner’s
available foods. Moreover, all tokens for foods available for either chimpanzee were

available at all times, so chimpanzees had access to tokens which did not match their
available food rewards. The only cost to these incorrect trades was time; the chimpanzees
were allowed an unlimited number of exchanges to acquire their foods. Despite this, the
chimpanzees learned very rapidly that they could acquire the foods only from their own
bin, and did not request the foods from their partners’ bins (Brosnan & Beran, 2009).
This indicates that that they understood at least on some level that those foods were not
‘theirs,’ as determined by the experimenter.
Even so, this still does not fully get at ownership, as the human experimenter
acted as a mediator. One difficulty with testing property in chimpanzees is that while
food items represent the strongest level of motivation, because of this they are also
unlikely to hold them for a long period of time without eating them. Thus it is difficult to
use food items as part of a study involving property. However, with a little creativity,
certain aspects of property may be tested using paradigms which get around the problems
inherent in food. For instance, tokens can be used which represent foods (and can later
be traded for foods, as in the above study) or food which cannot be consumed
immediately can be used. Both of these approaches have been used successfully, as is
discussed below.
2.1 The Endowment Effect. The issue of property can be addressed tangentially,
by testing for characteristics of property known to be exhibited by humans. One common
finding is that humans tend to behave irrationally when making decisions about their
property. One way in which this manifests is in a phenomenon referred to as the
endowment effect, in which individuals will pay more to keep an item that is in their
possession than they would have previously paid to obtain the same item. This implies

that individuals value what is in their possession simply because of that fact, even when
there has not been enough time to develop a sentimental attachment to it or additional
uses for it (Jones & Brosnan, 2008; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990).
Chimpanzees, too, increase their preference for items in their possession above
and beyond the value they indicated when the object was not in their possession (Brosnan,
Jones, Mareno, Richardson, Shapiro et al., 2007). In this study, chimpanzees were given
a series of sessions to determine how preferences changed dependent upon possession.
One session served to verify their preferences, while additional sessions offered them
opportunities to exchange what they were given initially for something else. There was
no cost to trading other than the few seconds the trade took. To make sure that the
chimpanzees were sufficiently motivated, foods were used instead of tokens representing
foods. The chosen foods were difficult to consume rapidly; one item was peanut butter
that had to be removed from a PVC tube and the other was a frozen juice stick that
subjects preferred not to bite into.
To establish preferences, chimpanzees were asked to choose between the two
foods. To determine whether or not the chimpanzees preferred to maintain possession of
those items which they had in their possession, chimpanzees were given each of the items
individually (in separate sessions) and then immediately offered the opportunity to
exchange for the other2. As with humans, as a group chimpanzees were more likely to
hold onto whichever food item they were given than was expected, based on their
preference for the items in the choice session. Individually, almost half of the
chimpanzees followed this pattern, choosing to hold onto whichever item they had been
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In the experiment itself, the order of presentation of these three sessions were randomized among the 36
subjects to assure that there was no ordering effect influencing responses.

given. All chimpanzees were willing to exchange food items away when something of
greater value (a banana) was offered, so their disinclination to exchange cannot be
explained by concern about the risks inherent in trading away food or the reliability of the
human experimenter.
Interestingly, this holds for foods, but not for other non-food objects with which
they interact. When the same study was repeated using two familiar toys, the
chimpanzees actually preferred to exchange, perhaps valuing the interaction with the
experimenter over the possibilities of the toys themselves (Brosnan, Jones, Mareno,
Richardson, Lambeth et al., 2007). This indicates that the endowment effect may hold
only for those objects which have great utility to the chimpanzees, such as food, and
indicates that even within a concept as basic as property, the context of the interaction
matters.
More recently, similar studies have been done with orangutans and capuchin
monkeys, indicating that they, too, show an endowment effect (Flemming, Jones,
Stoinski, Mayo, & Brosnan, in review; Lakshminarayanan, Chen, & Santos, 2008).
Capuchin monkeys also exhibit loss aversion, showing a preference for outcomes framed
as a reward over those framed as a loss despite the actual distribution of outcomes being
equal (Chen, Lakshminarayanan, & Santos, 2006). This is another ‘irrational’ behavior
which is often linked with the endowment effect. Taken with the results on chimpanzees,
it appears that this suite of irrational behaviors occurs in primates in general, supporting
the idea that concepts of property are broadly distributed in the primates, and likely
throughout the animal kingdom.

2.2 Barter. Another element of property is that it can be used to obtain more or
different property through trade and barter. In barter, an individual can trade an object in
their possession or under their ownership for another object possessed or owned by
someone else. In fact, this, in concert with specialization, is one of the core tenets of
economic theory. As such, there has been quite a bit of interest in whether other species
can barter. Adam Smith famously quoted that “It [barter, to exchange one thing for
another] is common to all men, and to be found in no other race of animals, which seem
to know neither this nor any other species of contracts… Nobody ever saw a dog make a
fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for another with another dog” (Smith 1776).
Barter has not been reported in wild populations, however chimpanzees and other species
do share food (e.g. Hockings et al, 2007; Feistner & McGrew, 1989), which is a related
behavior. There are also a few captive observations of spontaneous behavior which may
indicate the presence of exchange behavior in primates (Paquette, 1992).
Most studies thus far have required subjects to trade a token to a human
experimenter for another food item, which both chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys do
easily (Brosnan & de Waal, 2004, 2005; Hyatt & Hopkins, 1998). In fact, both of these
species also seem to understand the tokens as symbols, and can work with them flexibly
(Addessi, Crescimbene, & Visalberghi, 2007; Addessi, Mancini, Crescimbene, PadoaSchioppa, & Visalberghi, 2008; Savage-Rumbaugh, Rumbaugh, & Boysen, 1978).
However, this only indicates that primates can learn associations, but does not require the
subject to actually give up something of value to obtain something else. It is this latter,
more costly, exchange behavior that we typically consider when discussing barter.

Several studies on barter of food items have found that chimpanzees are not only
able to do this, but are very intelligent in how they barter with humans (Lefebvre, 1982;
Lefebvre & Hewitt, 1986). In these studies, chimpanzees were rational, trading foods
they did not like for those which they did, and trading more readily when the difference
in value between the food items was greater. They were also intelligent; the
experimenter would take any size food item in exchange for another, and the
chimpanzees learned to return very small bits of food, or even just a daub of saliva. This
behavior maximized their intake of both foods. A recent study replicated these findings
with a larger adult sample of chimpanzees (Brosnan, Grady, Lambeth, Schapiro, & Beran,
2008). In this study, chimpanzees received an endowment of 30 food items (of varying
types) and were given the opportunity to exchange those items for other food items.
Again, chimpanzees never traded food items for those which were less preferred, and
they always traded disfavored foods for much more preferred items. When food items
were close in value, subjects typically did not exchange. This behavior, similar to that
seen in the endowment effect study discussed above, indicates that chimpanzees are
hesitant to give up an item in their possession, possibly because of the risks of trade.
Note that all of the studies on barter discussed above have one significant
confound – they all involve trading with humans, rather than a subject of the same
species. This makes it difficult to extrapolate their behavior to natural circumstances, due
to the difference in the type of relationship between primate conspecifics (e.g. members
of the same species) and primates and humans. In the latter, the humans occupy an
atypical, omniscient/omnipotent role which may make the monkeys and apes react
differently than they would to a conspecific. However, human/primate barter is the norm

because of the difficulty inherent in getting primates to give up a food reward to another
individual. Even a well-trained chimpanzee is unlikely to voluntarily trade away a
preferred food item in their possession for another. This can be avoided through the use
of symbolic tokens, rather than foods.
In a recent study, chimpanzees were given tokens which bore symbols
representing foods, rather than the food items themselves (Brosnan & Beran, 2009; also
see above). These chimpanzees had trained to use these symbols as infants, and each
subject had at least 20 years’ experience with them, so they easily understood the
token/food associations (controls were run to verify that this was the case). In a series of
studies, chimpanzees were given several tokens. Some of these could be exchanged with
the experimenter to obtain foods, while others were worthless to them, but could be used
by another chimpanzee (their partner). Although chimpanzees initially were hesitant to
do so, they ultimately learned to trade tokens amongst themselves prior to exchanging
tokens for foods with the experimenter, which maximized the number of foods each
chimpanzee could receive. During this time there was experimenter oversight of the
interactions; the experimenter would not exchange with either ape until each chimpanzee
had traded a token of their choice with their partner (they could simply return the token
their partner had given to them). Once experimenter oversight was removed, though, all
trade behavior ceased within the first session. Instead, the chimpanzees simply returned
all of their tokens to the experimenter, and received many fewer food items than were
available.
This test indicates two interesting findings. First, chimpanzees are capable of
cognitively understanding trade, and will do so in a way which benefits themselves and

their partner. Second, experimenter control is apparently necessary for successful barter
among captive adult chimpanzees. These together indicate that there is significant risk
inherent in trading among chimpanzees. This may be due to the lack of recourse if the
partner fails to complete the trade. Humans have solved this problem through the
introduction of legal and policing systems which can enforce appropriate trade behavior
on others, minimizing the risk of any given interaction. Chimpanzees, lacking the ability
to communicate beyond the immediate (e.g. narrative language), would have difficulty
with third-party reinforcement except in situations in which the third party witnessed the
interaction (Brosnan, Grady, Lambeth, Schapiro, & Beran, 2008). Thus it is likely that,
despite an apparent lack of cognitive limitations, trading behavior has not evolved due to
the high costs inherent in a trading system without oversight and recourse. It is possible
that other species, which have less competitive social interactions, may show more of a
tendency towards barter behavior, but it is likely that the lack of narrative language limits
the development of extensive barter in all species besides humans.
3. Conclusion
Taken as a whole, the evidence supports the idea that, counter to Bentham’s
assertion, there are biological bases for property. While no other species has developed a
system of property ownership as complex and far-reaching as humans have, non-human
primates appear to have expectations related to objects, or social norms, which are in
their or another’s possession. This possession-centered concept of property makes
evolutionary sense; not only is it easier to defend property which is in one’s possession,
but the legal enforcements required for ownership are difficult or impossible to enforce
without the development of language.

Norms regarding possession are not the only property-related feature shared
between humans and other species. Experimental studies in nonhuman primates have
found evidence of behaviors (such as barter) and psychological features (such as the
endowment effect) which are seen in human property-related behavior. Perhaps the
critical difference between humans and other species is that in other species, individuals
may assume that they will need to enforce their right to their property by themselves,
without any recourse, while in humans we can rely on others to assist in maintaining our
property rights. Even if other species have the necessary cognitive underpinnings, such
as third-party enforcement of norms or well developed reciprocity, they still lack the
ability to communicate about other individuals’ misdeeds. This limits their ability either
to request assistance in reclaiming property or to warn others about those who do not
respect property, which seriously limits the extent to which these norms may develop.
Thus, the critical development for humans may have been the emergence of two
features; first, a norm which indicates that property outside of one’s immediate
possession or control is still property, and should not be taken by others (e.g. ownership;
see also Rochat, this volume), and second, the language skills necessary to recruit the
support of others in the maintenance of this norm. Together these could have led to the
development of formalized legal systems which protect ownership of property even when
it is outside of one’s immediate control or when an instance of theft takes place beyond
the observation of others. Although human property concepts differ from those of other
species, this comparative approach sheds light on the biological basis of the emergence of
property in humans and other animals.
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